Rouse argues that recent work in the philosophy of science shows a post “science wars” convergence between philosophies and social studies of science. This suggested convergence consists of four constructive thematic overlaps between the philosophers, anthropologists, and cultural historians of science: 1) a greater appreciation for the complexity of causation and a shift from explaining causation nomologically to theorizing “causal relations as an unavoidable target of scientific understanding” (14); 2) work on theoretical modeling, discursive practices, and experimental systems that shifts analytical energy from de/constructing the grounds of scientific truth claims to “how the sciences articulate our understanding of the world” (7); 3) a more nuanced, case-study style of approach to researching the localized and contingent nature of concept production in science; 4) works investigating the relationship between epistemic/conceptual understanding and perception/action. Rouse does not suggest that these convergences signify an ensuing utopic relationship between these historically oppositional fields. Rather he suggests that reading outside one’s discipline is necessary to produce constructive collaborations that shed light on the limits of any single disciplinary approach when pursued in isolation.
